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[Auto-Reply] I’m Driving—I’ll Get Back to
You Later: Why New York Should Recognize
Texters as Co-creators of Risk
COURTNEY A. WAY†
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a driver who causes a fender bender because he
was texting with a friend and failed to pay attention when
approaching a stop light. Of course, it seems implausible to
sue the friend who was texting with the driver who caused
the accident. Now, imagine a driver fighting with a friend
rapidly over text messaging finally replying, “can’t talk, we
† J.D. Candidate, 2020, University at Buffalo School of Law; B.A.
Psychology & Legal Studies, 2014, St. John Fisher College; Executive
Publications Editor, Buffalo Law Review. My sincerest gratitude to my
Buffalo Law Review colleagues, Alexa Archambault, Jenna Bauer,
Daylyn Blackman, and Courtney Dec for their hard work checking all
sources and citations that appear in this Comment. I would also like to
express my deep appreciation to Editor-in-Chief John Kuebler and
Executive Publications Editor Anthony Serianni, who painstakingly read
and re-read these pages until perfectly polished. I would like to thank
Professor Lucinda Finley for her helpful and insightful review of an
earlier draft of this Comment. Further, it would be remiss of me if I failed
to thank my dear friend and Buffalo Law Review Editor, Rebecca Postek,
who journeyed with me through many abstract ideas in order to create a
cohesive and cogent comment. Last, but definitely not least, a heartfelt
thank you to my husband, parents, and sister for listening to me talk
about this Comment endlessly and supporting me through draft after
draft.
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will continue this later. I am driving home now.” The friend
continues to text the driver, causing his phone to ring and
vibrate constantly on his drive home. While looking down to
see the twenty or more missed text messages from his friend,
the driver crosses the centerline and hits an oncoming
vehicle. The passengers of the oncoming car are killed. In
this scenario, the estate of the deceased may desire to sue the
friend who continued to text the driver after the driver made
the texter aware that he was driving and would settle the
argument later.1
Imposing duty on a third-party texter, more frequently
referred to as sender liability, is a new development in the
realm of tort law.2 Evolving from liability assessed in
distracted driving accidents, sender liability seeks to impose
a duty on third parties who are not in the vehicle, but who
text a driver, where such texts distract the driver and result
in the driver causing an accident.3 Presently, New York
courts have not recognized sender liability, nor has the
legislature addressed this growing threat to the welfare and
safety of innocent individuals on the roads.4 The law
currently responds to one part of the equation here: the
driver. But what about the sender? The sender of a text
message who has actual knowledge the recipient is driving
and will likely respond to the text message actively engages
1 See, e.g., Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2013) (“[W]hen a texter knows or has special reason to know that the intended
recipient is driving and is likely to read the text message while driving, the texter
has a duty to users of the public roads to refrain from sending the driver a text
at that time.”); Vega v. Crane, 49 N.Y.S.3d 264, 271 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (considering
the applicability of sender liability in New York); see generally Gallatin v.
Gargiulo, No. 10401 of 2015, C.A., 2016 WL 8715650 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 10,
2016) (considering applying sender liability in Pennsylvania).
2. See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1229 (establishing the theory of sender liability).
3. Id. at 1228 (“When the sender texts a person who is then driving, knowing
that the driver will immediately view the text, the sender has disregarded the
attendant and foreseeable risk of harm to the public.”).
4. See Vega, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 271 (refusing to adopt sender liability in New
York). For a discussion of New York’s consideration of the adoption of sender
liability, see infra Parts III, VI.
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in affirmative conduct that co-creates the risk to innocent
individuals on the road. Imposing duty on a party who cocreates risk is not a revolutionary expansion of duty and
therefore, the New York courts and legislature should not
approach this issue reluctantly.
This Comment highlights the growing safety risk of
texting while driving, explores the development of sender
liability, explains how New York courts could recognize such
liability without expanding duty, and considers how New
York State legislation should address this prevalent gap in
its tort law. Part II introduces landmark case law that has
recognized sender liability and the effects of such case law on
subsequent legislation. Part III examines the trivial
opportunity New York courts have had to address sender
liability and suggests how the courts may recognize sender
liability in the future without expanding traditional duty
concepts. Part IV discusses the general concept of sender
liability and how it relates to other types of third-party duty,
suggesting sender liability is not a revolutionary expansion
of the customary concepts of duty. Part V defines and
explains New York State Dram Shop law while considering
how it relates to sender liability and the possibility for
legislation in this developing area of tort law. Part VI
proposes considerations for New York legislation recognizing
sender liability and Part VII concludes this Comment by
discussing the ability of the courts to recognize sender
liability and discusses whether the New York State
legislature should proactively address sender liability.
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II. TEXTING WHILE DRIVING: AN EPIDEMIC IN NEED OF
JUDICIAL ATTENTION
While tort law certainly imposes liability on the texting
driver and most states have boosted penalties and fines
associated with texting while driving,5 there is another
instigator, a co-creator of the risk, who often escapes liability.
Distracted driving is an epidemic that kills more than 3,000
people and injures almost 400,000 people per year.6 Texting
while driving contributes to a significant portion of these
deaths and injuries.7 The penalties and fines currently in
place have not reduced the incidents of texting while driving
nearly as much as originally intended, thus necessitating the
need for more stringent laws and recognition of the senders
of text messages as co-creators of risk.8
5. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1225(c) (McKinney 2013).
6. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DISTRACTED DRIVING 2015 (last
updated Mar. 2017), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/
812_381_distracteddriving2015.pdf (citing that in 2015, there were 3,477 people
killed and an estimated additional 391,000 injured in crashes involving
distracted drivers).
7. See Sam Ogozalek, With Distracted Driving Cases on the Rise, DA Takes
‘It up a Notch,’ BUFFALO NEWS (July 20, 2018), https://buffalonews.com/2018/07/
20/tragic-distracted-driver-case-prompted-da-to-take-it-up-a-notch-when-filingcharge/ (noting the tragic distracted driving accidents in Western New York
including the death of a four-year-old boy when his father was texting and
slammed into the back of a tractor trailer, the death of a sixteen-year-old
pedestrian who was struck and killed by a driver who was texting, the death of a
thirty-three-year-old mother of two who was killed when a distracted driver hit
her disabled vehicle on the Thruway, and the death of a University at Buffalo
nursing professor when a driver filling out a video game survey struck and killed
her); Phil LeBeau, Texting and Driving Worse than Drinking and Driving,
CNBC.com (June 25, 2009, updated Aug. 3, 2010), https://www.cnbc.com/
id/31545004 (concluding that reaction times are up to four times slower when
checking an e-mail or text message on your phone while driving than drivers who
drive undistracted).
8. See generally Anne T. McCartt et al., Symposium, Driver Cellphone and
Texting Bans in the United States: Evidence of Effectiveness, 58 ANNALS
ADVANCES AUTOMOTIVE MED. 99–114 (2014); Steve Hughes, Texting tickets more
than double in New York but drivers are more likely to get a plea deal, TIMES
UNION (Apr. 18, 2018, 12:01 PM), https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Cellphone-tickets-more-than-double-in-New-York-12828177.php (concluding many
New York courts reduce texting while driving tickets, resulting in less points,
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The theory of sender liability is limited and specific. 9 It
requires that the texter “knows or has special reason to
know” that the recipient of the message is driving and that
the driver is “likely to read the text message while driving.”10
This foreseeability requirement results in the texter having
a duty to users of the road and, therefore, the texter should
refrain from texting the driver at that time, as it may result
in an accident.11 This is not a novel theory, as it is rooted in
widely accepted concepts of common-law third-party duty,
such as social host duty, distracted driver liability, and
passenger liability.12
A. Kubert v. Best: The Groundbreaking Sender Liability
Case
While exchanging text messages with a friend, a driver
of a pick-up truck collided with a couple on a motorcycle,
resulting in both individuals losing their left legs.13 The
Kuberts filed a lawsuit against Best, the driver of the pickup truck, as well as Best’s seventeen-year-old friend who was
texting Best immediately prior to the accident.14 An issue of
lower fines, and ultimately, less compliance with the law).
9. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. Michaela Cronin, Call Me, Beep Me, if Ya Wanna Reach Me—Unless I
Might Be Driving: An Analysis of Sender Liability and Why Pennsylvania Should
Not Hold Citizens Responsible for Car Accidents Caused by the Drivers They Text,
63 VILL. L. REV. 321, 336–37 (2018) (“In Pennsylvania, while no duty is generally
owed by passengers, ‘[a] passenger may owe a duty to protect a third person from
negligent acts of the driver where there is a “special relationship, joint enterprise,
joint venture, or a right to control the vehicle.”’” (quoting DALE G. LARRIMORE,
ESQ., WEST’S PA. PRAC., § 8:15 (2016–17 ed. 2016))); Denise Jones Lord, Beyond
Social Host Liability: Accomplice Liability, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 553, 564–65 (1989)
(asserting that the situation in Kubert is similar to social host liability because
in the context of social host liability, the social host is not present at the time of
the incident, just like the texter in Kubert was not present at the time of the
accident).
13. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1219.
14. Id. at 1214.
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first impression in New Jersey, the Superior Court,
Appellate Division considered on appeal whether a third
party who is texting a driver from a remote location can be
liable to injured parties because the text messaging
distracted the driver.15
Discovery during the trial revealed that Best and his
friend, Colonna, exchanged sixty-two text messages on the
day of the accident, including the messages that Best and
Colonna sent immediately prior to the accident.16 Consistent
with other state court decisions, the court held that a party
may not be liable for sending a text message merely because
a driver might use his phone unlawfully, as to become
distracted while driving.17 The court also held that a court
may not impose liability where an individual who knows that
the recipient of his text message is driving directs a text
message to that specific recipient.18 The court then turned to
the question of the sender having “special knowledge.”19
As the first court to acknowledge the possibility of sender
liability, the Kubert court did so carefully and strategically,
requiring that “additional proofs are necessary to establish
the sender’s liability.”20 In order to find sender liability, the

15. Id. at 1215.
16. Id. at 1219 (noting that the parties “averaged almost fourteen texts per
hour for the four-and-a-half-hour, non-consecutive time-span they were in
telephone contact on the day of the accident.”). Phone records revealed that only
seventeen seconds passed between Best sending a message to Colonna and the
time he called 911. During those seventeen seconds, Best hit the Kuberts, stopped
his vehicle, exited his vehicle, observed the Kuberts’ injuries, and dialed 911.
Therefore, the court inferred that the text message was sent almost
simultaneously with Best colliding with the Kuberts. The court held that the
distraction caused by texting while driving played a significant role in the
collision.
17. This was a case of first impression, and therefore the court considered
precedent cases of distracted driving generally, namely, cases where parties sued
technology manufacturers for negligent design of a device or software. Id. at 1226.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.

2020]

TEXTERS AS CO-CREATORS OF RISK

715

court required proof that the sender “knew or had special
reason to know that the driver would read the message while
driving and would thus be distracted from attending to the
road and the operation of the vehicle.”21 Relating sender
liability to passenger liability, the court held that a
passenger could be liable even if that passenger did not
actually obstruct the driver’s view, but demanded that the
driver advert his eyes from the road to look at a distracting
object.22 This hypothetical would lead the court to find
liability because the passenger knew or had special reason to
know that his actions would distract the driver.23 The same
ideology applies to senders of text messages who know or
have a special reason to know that the driver will be
distracted by the notifications from his phone.24 Concerned
with public policy, the court analogized texting and driving
with drinking and driving, concluding that because the harm
posed to others on the road is significant, there must be
liability for all parties involved, as the law recognizes in
drinking and driving cases.25

21. Id. (establishing sender liability by examining analogous circumstances
and applying a “full duty analysis” as discussed in Estate of Desir ex. rel.
Estiverne v. Vertus, 69 A.3d 1247, 1249 (N.J. 2013)). Vertus’ “full duty analysis”
required evaluation of four factors: (1) the relationship of the parties, (2) the
nature of the risk, (3) the ability to exercise care, and (4) public policy
considerations. 69 A.3d at 1255. Vertus, a premises liability case decided by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, held that “a premises owner owes a duty of care
to one injured off premises if the source of the injury is a dangerous condition on
the premises and if the injury is the result of a foreseeable risk to an identifiable
person.” Id. at 1248. In its opinion, however, the court noted that this expansive
view of the duty of care is not applied simply because the injury is foreseeable,
rather, that a party negligently created a dangerous situation under the four
established factors. Id. at 1249.
22. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 1228 (“When the sender texts a person who is then driving,
knowing that the driver will immediately view the text, the sender has
disregarded the attendant and foreseeable risk of harm to the public. The risk is
substantial, as evidenced by the dire consequences in this and similar cases
where texting drivers have caused severe injuries or death.”).
25. Id. at 1229.
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B. Post Kubert v. Best
Kubert articulated a new duty of care by holding that the
sender of a text message owes a limited duty to the public
when the sender “has actual knowledge or special reason to
know from prior texting experience or otherwise,” that the
recipient will view the text while driving.26 In response to the
texting and driving epidemic, New Jersey enacted additional
legislation in hopes of deterring texting while driving.27
“Kulesh, Kubert & Bolis’ Law” adds to New Jersey’s
vehicular homicide statute to include an inference of reckless
driving if the driver was using a phone at the time of the
accident.28 This amendment to the statute is in addition to
the statutory ban on texting while driving.29
In her article, Don’t Text a Driver: Civil Liability of
Remote Third-Party Texters After Kubert v. Best, Emily
Strider discusses the expansion of common-law negligence
principles to cover third parties in social host liability
contexts.30 Describing how these additions to New Jersey
statutes play out in trial, Strider notes, “[t]he key element in
both the vehicular homicide and assault by auto statutes is
the reckless driving of the vehicle.”31 The addition of the
inference of recklessness in cases where a driver was using a
phone increases the likelihood of conviction in vehicular
homicide and assault by auto cases because evidence of
texting immediately proves recklessness.32 The legislature of
26. Id. (internal citation omitted).
27. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5(a) (West 2012).
28. Id.
29. Emily K. Strider, Don’t Text a Driver: Civil Liability of Remote ThirdParty Texters After Kubert v. Best, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1003, 1014–16 (2015).
30. Id.
31. Id. (discussing New Jersey’s inclusion of the inference of recklessness
when a driver is using a phone has also been added to New Jersey’s assault by
auto statute, which addresses incidents where reckless driving results in bodily
injury to another).
32. Id. at 1008–09 (“Although such an inference is not binding on the jury, the
jury may rely on the inference alone to find that the defendant was driving
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forty-seven states, Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, Guam,
and the U.S. Virgin Islands have banned text messaging for
all drivers, and some of these jurisdictions have also
increased the penalties and fines associated with distracted
driving and the resulting accidents.33 Despite other states
recognizing the texting and driving epidemic, none have
enacted legislation as strict as the state of New Jersey, nor
have any courts recognized sender liability.34

recklessly.”).
33. Distracted Driving, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N, https://www.
ghsa.org/state-laws/issues/Distracted-Driving (last visited Nov. 26, 2019).
34. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013);
Vega v. Crane, 49 N.Y.S.3d 264, 265 (Sup. Ct. 2017).
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III. VEGA V. CRANE: A FIRST IMPRESSION SENDER LIABILITY
CASE IN NEW YORK STATE
A car accident occurring on a dark and rainy evening in
Genesee County, New York set the scene for New York to
address sender liability in the New York Supreme Court first
impression case of Vega v. Crane.35 The accident occurred
when the decedent’s vehicle crossed the centerline and
struck Vega’s vehicle head-on.36 Upon investigation, the New
York State Police concluded that the decedent was likely
distracted, having found a cell phone located between the
decedent’s legs after inspection of his vehicle.37 Further
investigation revealed that the decedent and a friend,
Cratsley, were texting before the accident occurred.38 During
her deposition, Cratsley admitted to texting the decedent on
the day of the accident; however, she indicated that she was
unaware that the decedent was driving at the time that they
were texting.39
Vega argued that the court should follow in the steps of
Kubert, while Cratsley cited to precedent New York case law
that refused to impose liability on individuals who did not
have control over third parties.40 The court, hesitant to

35. Vega, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 265.
36. Id.
37. New York State Police concluded that the decedent was likely distracted
because the scene lacked any signs that the decedent attempted to avoid colliding
with Vega’s vehicle. Id.
38. Id.
39. Upon investigation it was determined that none of the text messages
between the decedent and Cratsley contradicted Cratsley’s statements. Id.
40. Vega further relied on Sartori v. Gregoire, 688 N.Y.S.2d 295 (App. Div.
1999) for the proposition that a passenger may be liable for distracting a driver
immediately prior to an accident. She also cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 303 (AM. LAW INST. 1965), which provides, “[a]n act is negligent if the actor
intends it to affect, or realizes or should realize that it is likely to affect, the
conduct of . . . a third person . . . in such a manner as to create an unreasonable
risk of harm to the other.” Cratsley reasoned that the court should follow New
York precedent such as Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1021–22 (N.Y. 1976),
holding that liability will not be imposed on an individual who lacks control over
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deviate from New York’s long-standing adherence to
negligence law first set forth in Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad,41 refused to adopt the new duty created by
Kubert.42 In its opinion, the court conceded that the New
York State Court of Appeals has gradually expanded the
duty of care, but declined to do so in this case by limiting
those holdings to each case’s unique fact pattern.43
New York courts have historically refused to broaden the
scope of negligence. In some rare cases, they have slightly
broadened the scope, but only did so reluctantly.44 One of
those rare cases is Davis v. South Nassau Communities
Hospital.45 In Davis, the New York State Court of Appeals
expanded the duty of care to third-party medical
professionals and hospitals.46 In its holding, the court
the third party. Id.
41. See generally 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
42. Vega, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 268 (discussing the court’s strict adherence to the
doctrine of negligence first debuted in Palsgraf. The court notes that Palsgraf
held that no duty of care is owed to a third party if the injury is not reasonably
foreseeable and asserts that if it chose to adopt the new duty created by Kubert,
it would be broadening the Palsgraf scope of duty).
43. Id. at 270.
44. Id. at 267.
45. 46 N.E.3d 614 (N.Y. 2015).
46. Id. at 624 (holding that despite the holding in Purdy v. Public Adm’r of
County of Westchester, 526 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1988) courts have imposed a duty of
care where there exists a special relationship between the parties). In Davis, the
hospital gave a patient a controlled substance and then discharged her. Shortly
after the administration of the medication and her discharge, the patient crashed
her vehicle into a bus operated by the plaintiff, injuring him. Id. at 617. The court
reasoned that the patient was not properly educated regarding the medication
she was prescribed and how it would affect her ability to operate a vehicle. Id. at
623. Therefore, the court held that the medical professionals and hospital, as
third parties, had a “special relationship” with the plaintiff and therefore imposed
a duty. Id. at 622. In its analysis the court reasoned:
[O]ur calculus is such that we assign the responsibility of care to the
person or entity that can most effectively fulfill that obligation at the
lowest cost. It is against that backdrop that we conclude that, under the
facts alleged, defendants owed plaintiffs a duty to warn Walsh that the
medication defendants administered to Walsh impaired her ability to
safely operate a motor vehicle.
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reasoned, “[a] critical consideration in determining whether
a duty exists is whether ‘the defendant’s relationship with
either the tortfeasor or the plaintiff places the defendant in
the best position to protect against the risk of harm.’”47
However, as illustrated by Vega, New York courts are
cautious in expanding duty to third parties and in cases such
as this, prefer to defer to the legislature to determine what
is actionable.48
There is no reason for Vega to be the last word on sender
liability in New York. When it comes to recognizing texters
as co-creators of risk, it should not matter that New York
courts have historically refused to broaden the scope of duty.
Recognizing sender liability is not in any way a revolutionary
expansion of duty. A texter is a co-creator of risk just like the
bartender who overserves a patron who then gets behind the
wheel and causes an accident; or the social host who allows
teens to throw a party with underage drinking at their home,
and one of those teens tragically dies after overconsumption;
or the healthcare provider who prescribes a sedative to an
individual without proper warning, resulting in the
individual using the drug, driving, and subsequently causing
an accident.49 Texters are not passive third-party observers.
Texters are third parties who engage in affirmative conduct
that poses risk to innocent individuals.50
Id. at 618.
47. Id. (quoting Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061
(N.Y. 2001)).
48. See Vega, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 272 (“[C]ourts are not free to decide what should
be founded in statutory authority. This is the realm of the legislature. Simply
put, if the legislature wishes to make actionable a third party’s texting to a
motorist, notwithstanding their lack of knowledge that the person to whom they
are texting is driving, they should do so. This Court refuses to establish this cause
of action by judicial fiat.”).
49. See, e.g., Davis, 46 N.E.3d at 617; Rust v. Reyer, 693 N.E.2d 1074, 1076
(N.Y. 1998); Place v. Cooper, 827 N.Y.S.2d 396, 397 (App. Div. 2006); Carr v.
Kaifler, 601 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (App. Div. 1993); Custen v. Salty Dog, Inc., 566
N.Y.S.2d 348, 348 (App. Div. 1991); Montgomery v. Orr, 498 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970–
71 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
50. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559, 572–73 (Mass. 2019). On
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IV. SENDER LIABILITY: ROOTED IN WELL-ESTABLISHED DUTY
PRINCIPLES
A. Social Host Liability
New York State recognizes social host liability.51 Even in
circumstances where injury occurs off premises, New York
typically finds liability under common-law negligence.52 In
cases of social host liability, a court may hold a host liable for
harm caused by guests to third parties where the furnishing
of alcohol is the proximate cause of injury.53 However, New
appeal, the defendant argued she did not inflict serious bodily harm on the victim.
The defendant contended “infliction” required direct, physical causation of harm,
not mere proximate causation, and that from her remote location, she could not
have inflicted serious bodily harm on the victim under the relevant statute. The
court held defendant’s argument was an “unduly narrow” interpretation and that
by its terms, the statute required the offense involve the infliction of serious
bodily harm, not that the defendant herself be the one who directly inflicted it.
The court stated, “[i]f we were to interpret the statute to include such a
requirement, it is difficult to see how a [suspect] could be indicted as a[n] . . .
offender for, say, hiring a third party to carry out an attack on a victim.” It is
enough, the court continued, “that involuntary manslaughter in these
circumstances inherently involves the infliction of serious bodily harm.” Further,
the court held the defendant was reckless in her actions stating, “based on her
own knowledge of the danger to the victim and on her choice to run the risk that
he would comply with her instruction to get back into the truck.” Id. at 573.
Ultimately, the court held the defendant was reckless in her conduct of texting
the victim because she knew of the danger of her conduct toward the victim and
chose to run the risk that the victim would comply. Recognition of sender liability
falls in line with the court’s reasoning in Carter. Where a texter recklessly texts
a driver knowing the danger of their conduct and that the driver is likely to
answer the text, the texter runs the risk that the victim will answer. There is no
reason to find direct, physical causation of harm, rather, the infliction of serious
bodily harm, even from a remote location is enough. See id. at 574.
51. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 11-100, 11-101 (McKinney 2010); Rust, 693
N.E.2d at 1076–77; Montgomery, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
52. See Montgomery, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
53. See Jennifer Edelson, “ETA?” Estimated Time of Arrival: An Analysis of
New Jersey’s Remote Texting Liability, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1939, 1956 (2016)
(“Perhaps the most analogous form of imputed liability to remote texting is social
host liability.”); Social Host Liability, THOMSON REUTERS: FINDLAW, https://injury
.findlaw.com/accident-injury-law/social-host-liability.html (last visited Nov. 26,
2019) (“Most states have enacted laws holding party hosts liable for any alcoholrelated injuries that occur as a result of providing alcohol to minors. This includes
injuries to the minor as well as any other individuals whose injuries or death
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York courts apply social host duty only in instances where
injury occurs on the individual’s premises where a minor is
furnished alcohol.54
Oftentimes, injuries occur off premises after an
individual furnishes alcohol to a minor.55 In these cases, New
York courts have applied common-law negligence to reach
the third-party individual who furnished alcohol.56 Given
this gap in legislation, common-law negligence implicates a
person who is not physically present at the place and time of
the event that gives rise to the cause of action.57 Applying the
common law in this manner, New York courts have
interpreted third-party liability in a way similar to New
Jersey’s sender liability.58
In Montgomery v. Orr, the New York Supreme Court,
Oneida County, held that a parent could be liable under
common-law negligence because the parent allowed minors
to consume alcohol at a graduation party, which resulted in
a fatal car accident after one of the minors left the party.59
Despite New York’s inability to recognize a cause of action
against a social host for negligence of a guest that occurs
away from the site, the court analyzed the issue under
common-law negligence as well as a violation under N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 260.20.60 The court noted that its opinion
resulted from the minor being provided with alcohol. Some states have more
general social host liability laws, which are not limited to just minors but to
anyone who was encouraged or allowed to drink excessively to the point where
he or she was injured or killed, or caused another’s injury or death.”).
54. See GEN. OBLIG. § 11-100; Rust, 693 N.E.2d at 1077.
55. See, e.g., Rust, 693 N.E.2d at 1075; Montgomery, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
56. See Rust, 693 N.E.2d at 1076–77; Montgomery, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
57. Strider, supra note 29, at 1014 (discussing the expansion of common-law
negligence principles to cover third parties in social host liability contexts).
58. See id.
59. 498 N.Y.S.2d at 972–74 (deciding the case under N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 260.20, but noting that, “[h]ad this accident occurred but some 118 days later,
plaintiff’s cause of action would fall squarely within the provisions of [GEN. OBLIG.
§ 11-100].”).
60. Id. at 972 (holding that a third party may bring an action in common-law
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supported public policy notions, including a need to reduce
underage drinking and the injuries that result.61
New York courts have viewed social host liability and
common-law negligence liberally in cases of underage
drinking and resulting third-party injuries.62 In further
expanding social host liability under public policy
considerations, Rust v. Reyer held that N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 11-100 should be interpreted broadly, as to impose liability
on social hosts who furnish alcoholic beverages to minors.63
The court in Rust focused intently on the definition of
“furnishing,” as used in the statute and expanded it by
holding that the purpose of the statute was to employ civil
penalties as a deterrent against underage drinking.64 Public
policy directs courts to interpret the statute broadly as to
deter underage drinking by imposing civil penalties to those
who provide, supply, or give alcohol to an underage person.65
negligence for injuries that are shown to be causally connected to a breach of
§ 260.20(4)).
61. Id. (“Experience has shown that drinking by underage persons produces
not only injurious consequences to the minor, but to others. This is especially so
when you combine the drinking with driving. Recent state and national studies
have shown a direct corollary between teenage drinking and the number of motor
vehicle accidents and resulting injuries and deaths.”).
62. See, e.g., Rust v. Reyer, 693 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 (N.Y. 1998); Montgomery,
498 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
63. 693 N.E.2d at 1077 (holding that Reyer, a teen hosting a party at her
parents’ house while they were out of town, could be liable as a social host under
GEN. OBLIG. § 11-100). Reyer agreed to allow students from a fraternity to bring
beer to a party and charge those who attended the party in exchange for a share
of the profits. Id. at 1075. A fight ensued at the party and a guest was injured.
Analyzing the facts under GEN. OBLIG. § 11-100 the court held that “[t]he facts
alleged demonstrate that Reyer was more than an unknowing bystander or an
innocent dupe whose premises were used by other minors seeking to drink” and
“was more than a passive participant who merely knew of the underage drinking
and did nothing else to encourage it. Reyer played an indispensable role in the
scheme to make the alcohol available to the underage party guests.” Id. at 1077
(internal citations omitted).
64. Id. at 1076–77.
65. Id. at 1077 (citing the purpose of the legislature in enacting GEN. OBLIG.
§ 11-100 and comparing § 11-100 with Dram Shop laws). The court quoted the
legislature stating that:
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B. Distracted Driver and Passenger Liability
A passenger has a duty not to distract a driver when the
driver is operating the vehicle.66 Courts typically impose
liability on passengers who breach this duty, either by
holding that the passenger is contributorily liable, or
completely liable for injuries to plaintiffs.67 In Collins v.
McGinley, a passenger sued a driver who failed to stop at an
intersection and collided with another vehicle.68 In its
holding, the court considered evidence that the passenger
distracted the driver and ultimately apportioned liability
between both the passenger and the driver.69 In a more
egregious case, the court in Good v. MacDonell held that the
passenger, who tugged the steering wheel and caused the
vehicle to collide with pedestrians, was liable for all of the
injuries inflicted.70
One of the first cases to decide manufacturer liability for
distracted driving was Durkee v. Geologic Solutions, Inc.71 In
Durkee, a truck driver was using an in-truck text messaging
system and, while distracted with the system, collided with

Over the years, numerous court cases have dealt extensively with the
question of common law liability on the part of those who knowingly
furnish alcoholic beverages to under-age persons at graduation parties,
church socials, wedding receptions, office parties, and college campuses.
Under-age persons consuming excess alcohol at these social events
unquestionably have the same propensity to do harm to the traveling
public as those who have been served alcohol pursuant to a sale. (1983
N.Y. Legis. Ann., at 281).
66. See Collins v. McGinley, 558 N.Y.S.2d 979, 980 (App. Div. 1990); Good v.
MacDonell, 564 N.Y.S.2d 949, 952 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
67. Collins, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 564 N.Y.S.2d at 953 (“The sudden yanking of the steering wheel by the
defendant Garris without prior warning was clearly the sole proximate cause of
the car striking the pedestrian and going out of control.”).
71. 502 F. App’x 326, 327 (4th Cir. 2013), aff’g Durkee v. C.H. Robinson
Worldwide, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 742 (W.D.N.C. 2011).
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vehicles that had stopped in front of him.72 The court held
that “the accident was caused by the driver’s inattention, not
the texting device itself, and that manufacturers are not
required to design a product incapable of distracting a
driver.”73 Since Durkee, many courts have considered the
question of whether a technology manufacturer may be liable
under theories of negligence, products liability, or both, for
software that fails to “lock” a cellphone while a car is in
motion.74 In 2010, an appellate court in Oklahoma held that
“[t]he purchase and use of a cellular phone or cellular service
are not inherently dangerous acts, nor is it foreseeable that
the sale and subsequent use of such a phone would cause an
accident.”75 In 2018, following a distracted driving accident
in Texas that involved a driver using FaceTime, the issue
was yet again whether a smartphone maker has a duty to
prevent the use of an application that may distract drivers. 76
In Modisette, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth District
held that Apple did not owe a duty of care to the parents of
the deceased when a motorist who was using FaceTime while
driving hit and killed their daughter.77 The court further
held that the facts as presented lacked a showing of

72. Id.
73. Id. at 327–28.
74. See Meador v. Apple Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 2649 (2019); Modisette v. Apple Inc., 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 213 (Ct.
App. 2018); Estate of Doyle v. Sprint/Nextel Corp., 248 P.3d 947, 949 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2010).
75. Estate of Doyle, 248 P.3d at 951 (discussing negative public policy if the
court imposed duty on the cellphone company). The court in Estate of Doyle stated
that “[i]t is foreseeable to some extent that there will be drivers who eat, apply
make up [sic], or look at a map while driving and that some of those drivers will
be involved in car accidents because of the resulting distraction” but that “it
would be unreasonable to find it sound public policy to impose a duty on the
restaurant or cosmetic manufacturer or map designer to prevent such accidents.”
Id. at 950–51 (quoting Williams v. Cingular Wireless, 809 N.E.2d 473, 478 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004)).
76. See Modisette, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 213–14.
77. Id. at 213.
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causation.78
Meador was the most recent case to tackle the question
of whether a technology manufacturer owes a duty to thirdparty drivers because the software fails to “warn” drivers or
“lock” the device.79 Although the court refused to find that
the iPhone 5 or its software was a cause in fact of the injuries
alleged, the court did not do so directly.80 Given the Fifth
Circuit did not directly reject the plaintiff’s arguments, but
rather declined to decide an issue that the state had yet to
speak directly on, it seems that this issue will continue to
permeate the courts as technology continues to evolve and
consume all aspects of daily life.81
C. Healthcare Provider Third-Party Duty
New York courts have found third-party duty where a
healthcare provider failed to provide a patient sufficient
instruction upon discharge. In Davis v. South Nassau
Communities Hospital, the New York State Court of Appeals
expanded the duty of care to third-party medical
professionals and hospitals.82 In its holding, the court
reasoned, “[a] critical consideration in determining whether
a duty exists is whether ‘the defendant’s relationship with
either the tortfeasor or the plaintiff places the defendant in
the best position to protect against the risk of harm.’”83

78. Id.
79. Meador, 911 F.3d at 263 (considering plaintiff’s claims that that receipt of
a text message triggers in the recipient “an unconscious and automatic,
neurobiological compulsion to engage in texting behavior,” and therefore, Apple
failed to implement the patent on the iPhone 5 and failed to warn iPhone 5 users
about the risks of distracted driving).
80. Id. at 267 (holding that under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
it was not for the court to decide whether “Texas law would regard a smartphone’s
effect on a user as a substantial factor in the user’s tortious acts.”).
81. See id.
82. 46 N.E.3d 614, 624 (N.Y. 2015).
83. Id. at 618 (quoting Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055,
1061 (N.Y. 2001)).
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In its opinion, the court stated that taking the step of
administering the medication without warning the patient
about the disorienting effects of the drug was to create a
danger that affected all motorists on the road.84 Further, the
court noted that the healthcare provider was the only person
that could have given the patient the proper warning of the
negative effect of the drugs.85 Therefore, the court held the
healthcare provider had a duty to warn the patient about the
potential for the drug to impair her ability to safely operate
an automobile.86 This does not differ from sender liability,
where the texter is the only person that could refrain from
sending their text to the driver and effectively negate the risk
of the driver responding to the text while driving.
D. Distinction from Sender Liability: Manufacturer Liability
Although courts have yet to impose liability on
technology manufacturers, they are less reluctant to consider
imposing liability when an individual takes a foreseeable
risk in sending a text message to a driver.87 Plaintiffs argue
that a key difference between these circumstances is that in
the context of an individual texting a driver, there is stronger
evidence of foreseeability.88 Bearing in mind public policy,
courts have been more liberal in considering finding liability
where an individual takes a foreseeable risk when texting a
driver, compared to a technology manufacturer failing to
include software that “warns” all drivers or “locks” all phones

84. Id. at 622.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1228 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
88. Compare id. at 1227 (“[I]f the sender knows that the recipient is both
driving and will read the text immediately, then the sender has taken a
foreseeable risk in sending a text at that time. The sender has knowingly engaged
in distracting conduct, and it is not unfair also to hold the sender responsible for
the distraction.”), with Estate of Doyle v. Sprint/Nextel Corp., 248 P.3d 947, 951
(Okla. Civ. App. 2010) (“[N]or is it foreseeable that the sale and subsequent use
of such a phone would cause an accident.”).
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while a vehicle is in motion.89
Evidence of foreseeability in accidents caused by
distracted driving is essential, but not determinative of a
third-party duty.90 The court in Modisette created an
exception to the duty of care even in a circumstance where it
found foreseeability.91 However, the Kubert court held that
in circumstances where an individual takes a foreseeable
risk and sends a text message to a driver, it is fair to hold
this sender of a text message responsible for the
distraction.92 The relationship between distracted driving,
foreseeability, and duty is both complicated and
controversial, creating an imperative issue for New York
State to begin to consider.

89. See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227; Estate of Doyle, 248 P.3d at 950.
90. See Modisette v. Apple Inc., 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 220–21 (Ct. App. 2018).
91. Id. at 221 (holding that it was foreseeable that Apple’s design of the
iPhone 6 which failed to incorporate lockout technology could result in a car
accident, however, that such foreseeability did not result in the court recognizing
a duty of care).
92. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227.
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V. NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATURE’S RECOGNITION OF
CO-CREATORS OF RISK: DRAM SHOP LAWS
The New York State legislature has enacted laws to halt
epidemics that offend public policy.93 The New York State
legislature established the first DWI law in 1890, which was
amended to mirror “modern” statutes in 1910.94 Over a halfcentury later, New York passed chemical testing laws, which
allowed prosecutors to use compulsory blood tests as
evidence to prove alcohol in the bloodstream for liability
under DWI laws.95 Most notably, however, is the legislature’s
recognition of the driving-while-intoxicated epidemic
through its enactment of the Dram Shop Act. First passed in
1873, the legislature has amended and supplemented the
Dram Shop Act frequently, but the fundamental foundation
of imposing liability on a remote third party remains.96
Common law does not impose liability on a bar owner
who provides alcohol to a customer who later injures another
due to his intoxication.97 In these circumstances, the courts
historically held that the intoxicated customer was the
proximate cause of his own inebriation and any injury that
followed—whereas such injury to another was unforeseeable
to the bar owner.98
As a response to the driving-while-intoxicated epidemic,
which results in hundreds of fatalities per year, the New

93. See Daniel Gross, Closing the Loophole: Shea’s Law and DWI Blood Draws
in New York State Under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(4)(A)(1), 74 ALB. L. REV.
951, 952–54 (2011).
94. Id. at 953.
95. Id. (suggesting that chemical testing legislation as well as New York’s
“STOP DWI” campaign were moves by the legislature that “clearly expressed its
interest in promoting the goal of public safety . . . .”).
96. See id. at 953–55.
97. See Sheehy v. Big Flats Cmty. Day, Inc., 541 N.E.2d 18, 22 (N.Y. 1989)
(holding that there was no common-law cause of action for persons injured
because of their own voluntary intoxication).
98. See, e.g., D’Amico v. Christie, 518 N.E.2d 896, 898 (N.Y. 1987); Berkeley
v. Arthur Park, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290, 293 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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York State legislature enacted N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 11-101 in 1963 and amended the law in 1980.99 This portion
of New York’s Dram Shop law imposes liability on a party
who sells alcohol to an intoxicated individual if that
intoxicated individual injures another.100 Under the statute,
the following three elements must be proved in order to find
the party who sold the alcohol liable: (1) the seller unlawfully
sold or procured alcohol for the intoxicant; (2) the seller sold
the alcohol to the intoxicant when the intoxicant was visibly
intoxicated; and (3) there exists a “reasonable connection”
between the intoxication and the plaintiff’s injury.101
The first element of the statute is that the seller
unlawfully sold or procured alcohol for the intoxicant.102
Courts have consistently interpreted that this element of the
statute only applies in the context of commercial sales of
alcohol.103 In Carr v. Kaifler and Custen v. Salty Dog, Inc.,
the courts held that a restaurant or bar’s custom of providing
free alcoholic beverages to its employees during work shifts
did not constitute a commercial sale and therefore, declined
to impose Dram Shop liability.104 Further, in Place v. Cooper,
a minor’s mother provided alcohol to her son and his friend
and the court declined to impose Dram Shop liability because
it was undisputed that the mother did not commercially sell
alcohol to her son or his friend.105 Even when a court
determines that a commercial sale exists, the plaintiff must
prove that the sale of alcohol was directed to the individual
who caused the injury to another in order for Dram Shop
99. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 11-100, 11-101 (McKinney 2010).
100. Id.
101. See generally id.; Sheehy, 541 N.E. 2d at 20.
102. GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101.
103. See, e.g., Place v. Cooper, 827 N.Y.S.2d 396, 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006);
Carr v. Kaifler, 601 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Custen v. Salty Dog, Inc.,
566 N.Y.S.2d 348, 348 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
104. Carr, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 9; Custen, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
105. Place, 827 N.Y.S.2d at 396 (establishing that liability under Dram Shop
requires the commercial sale of alcohol).
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liability to apply.106 In Sherman v. Robinson, the court held
that a convenience store was not liable for an indirect sale
because the purchaser was not intended to be the sole
consumer of the alcohol.107 In its analysis, the court noted
that the intoxicated individual must have been present
during the sale, provided the money for the alcohol, or took
possession of the alcohol once the sale was made in order to
show a “direct sale.”108
The second element of the Dram Shop Act requires that
the sale of alcohol be made to an intoxicated individual.109
This element limits the expansive liability the Dram Shop
Act places on commercial sellers by requiring that the seller
have a reasonable basis for knowing that the consumer was
intoxicated at the time of sale.110 This imposes a
foreseeability component because an individual who sells
alcohol to an intoxicated person could reasonably foresee
that the intoxicated individual could injure another.111 In
Wolf v. Paxton-Farmer, the court held that evidence of an
individual consuming one mixed beverage and a portion of
another was insufficient to establish that the individual was
intoxicated.112 This holding establishes that under the Dram
Shop Act, there must be sufficient evidence to establish that
the individual was visibly intoxicated. Demanding such,
along with the third element requiring a “reasonable
106. Sherman v. Robinson, 606 N.E.2d 1365, 1368–69 (N.Y. 1992).
107. Id. (“Given the Legislature’s choice not to provide liability for the indirect
sale in this case, we decline to expand the common law to impose such liability.”
(quoting Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984))). The court commented on
the legislature’s power, stating, “[i]n this State, ‘the very existence of a Dram
Shop Act constitutes a substantial argument against expansion of the
legislatively-mandated liability.’” Id. at 1369 (quoting D’Amico v. Christie, 518
N.E.2d 896, 900 (N.Y. 1987)).
108. See id. at 1368–69
109. Id.
110. See id. at 1367.
111. See Howard S. Shafer & Mika Mooney, A Refresher on New York Dram
Shop Liability, 37 TORTS, INS. & COMP. L. SEC. J. 17, 17–18 (2008).
112. 803 N.Y.S.2d 468, 468 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
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connection” between the individual’s intoxication and the
plaintiff’s injury, are essential to ensuring that the Dram
Shop Act does not impose sweeping liability.113 Because the
Dram Shop Act is a deviation from the common law, it is
strictly applied only in cases where there is sufficient
evidence to prove that the seller sold to a visibly intoxicated
person.114
The last element required by the Dram Shop Act to
impose liability is the existence of a “reasonable connection”
between the intoxication and the plaintiff’s injury.115 This
requirement frames the legislation to apply only in cases
where the selling of alcohol to an intoxicated person results
in injury to another.116 One result of this requirement is that
intoxicated persons may not recover under the Dram Shop
Act if they injure themselves in their own intoxicated
condition.117 In Searly v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., a
minor consumed alcohol he obtained from a Wegmans
grocery store and lost control of his vehicle, resulting in a car
crash and subsequently, his death.118 The Appellate
Division, Fourth Department held that the statute does not
create a cause of action in favor of one injured as a result of
his or her own intoxication and there is no common-law cause
of action either.119
New York State’s Dram Shop Act reflects the
legislature’s intent to correct the ongoing driving while

113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 11-100, 11-101 (McKinney 2010); Shafer &
Mooney, supra note 111, at 19.
116. See GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101.
117. See id.
118. 807 N.Y.S.2d 768, 768 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
119. See id. (“It is well settled that General Obligations Law §§ 11-100 and 11101 do not create a cause of action in favor of one injured as a result of his own
intoxicated condition.”).
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intoxicated epidemic.120 Imposing liability on remote third
parties who play a material role in driving while intoxicated
incidents, such as bar owners who serve intoxicated
individuals, spreads liability and deters not only drinking
while driving, but also serving individuals who are drinking
while driving.121
Critics of Dram Shop laws are concerned with the lack of
personal responsibility imposed on individuals in cases
where the courts hold third parties liable for serving visibly
intoxicated persons.122 The argument follows that the person
who overconsumes alcohol then decides to drive while
intoxicated, resulting in injury to another, should bear the
entire burden of their actions, including liability in
lawsuits.123 Further, critics highlight that Dram Shop laws
punish businesses that serve alcohol because these
businesses must carry expensive liability insurance as well
as fees associated with being sued over accidents caused by
intoxicated patrons when sued under exceptions to their
policies.124 It is argued that Dram Shop laws also punish

120. See GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101; Wolf v. Paxton-Farmer, 803 N.Y.S.2d
468, 469 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Shafer & Mooney, supra note 111, at 19.
121. See GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101.
122. See Tobias v. Sports Club, 474 S.E.2d 450, 456 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (“In
our view, a rule which allows an intoxicated individual to hold a tavern owner
liable without regard to his own actions in continuing to consume alcohol
promotes irresponsibility and rewards drunk driving.”); Estate of Kelly v. Falin,
896 P.2d 1245, 1250 (Wash. 1995) (“Given a choice between a rule that fosters
individual responsibility and one that forsakes personal accountability, we opt
for personal agency over dependency and embrace individual autonomy over
paternalism.”).
123. The Supreme Court of South Carolina in Tobias, 474 S.E.2d at 454
addressed Dram Shop critics’ viewpoint which allowed intoxicated drivers to have
a first party cause of action against tavern owners when injured in an accident,
as established by Christiansen v. Campbell, 328 S.E.2d 351, 354 (S.C. Ct. App.
1985). Tobias overturned Christiansen, limiting the protection of intoxicated
individuals who drink and drive by establishing that alcohol control statutes do
not create a first party cause of action for an intoxicated adult person, but that
they do permit a third party action.
124. Mary M. French, Jim L. Kaput & William R. Wildman, Social Host
Liability for the Negligence Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1058,
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businesses by requiring refusal of service to patrons who
appear visibly intoxicated, resulting in declining sales.125
Dram Shop laws impose liability on remote third parties
for serving alcohol to intoxicated persons.126 However,
refusing service or evicting customers poses its own legal
issues.127 Dram Shop laws require that those who serve
alcohol refrain from serving visibly intoxicated customers,
but improper refusal of service can lead to customer suits
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which restaurant
and bar owners try to avoid at all costs.128 Furthermore,
evicting an intoxicated individual who continues to order
alcoholic beverages can pose issues because upon eviction
from the premises, the intoxicated individual may choose to

1120 (1985) (“Between approximately 1971 and 1979, for example, one California
tavern owner’s premium climbed from $10,000 to $190,000. About one-third of
California’s 25,000 tavern owners chose to risk liablity [sic] rather than pay the
high premium.” (footnotes omitted)). Tort law aims to provide innocent victims
compensatory justice in the event of a loss. Dram Shop laws seek to compensate
injured persons, especially in situations where the injured person cannot be made
whole from the automobile insurance of the intoxicated driver or the assets of the
intoxicated driver. Further, tort law seeks to deter behavior that is injurious to
others. An argument could be made that some establishments that do not carry
sufficient insurance will not be punished effectively under Dram Shop laws and
furthermore, the injured party will not be made whole if the establishment’s
insurance is not sufficient or the establishment is able to file bankruptcy, become
effectively judgment-proof, and then reopen under another name. Regardless,
statistics prove the effectiveness of Dram Shop laws. Since the implementation
of Dram Shop laws in the early 1980s, the number of drunk driving deaths has
been cut in half. Further, the percentage of all traffic fatalities that are alcoholrelated has declined from about fifty-four percent in 1986 to about thirty-nine
percent in 1997. The alcohol-induced fatality rate has continued to decline
through 2013, from forty-four percent in 2004 to thirty-four percent in 2013.
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., Alcohol-Impaired Driving (Dec. 2014),
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812102.pdf (reporting 2013 traffic safety
facts).
125. See French, Kaput & Wildman, supra note 124, at 1121–22.
126. See GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101.
127. See Kramer v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 641 So. 2d 557, 570 (La. Ct. App. 1994);
Dogan Gursoy, Christina G. Chi & Denney G. Rutherford, Alcohol-Service
Liability: Consequences of Guest Intoxication, 30 INT’L J. HOSP. MGMT. 714, 716
(2011).
128. See Gursoy et al., supra note 127, at 716.
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drive—initiating the issue that Dram Shop laws seek to
prevent.129 Dram Shop laws also incentivize commercial
establishments that serve alcohol to invest in additional
insurance to assist in potential future lawsuits under Dram
Shop.130 The issues associated with Dram Shop laws,
including improper refusal or eviction and increased
insurance implications, result in critics concluding that
Dram Shop laws are ineffective and ultimately aim to punish
the wrong party.131 At the end of the day, individuals are
responsible for their own negligence and many argue that
Dram Shop laws simply place liability on a third party who
cannot control the acts of individuals who choose to drive
while intoxicated.132

129. In Kramer, a motel allowed a high school party where underage attendees
drank alcohol. After several complaints, the motel evicted all non-registered
attendees. 641 So. 2d at 561. The plaintiff left in a vehicle driven by an attendee
of the party. The attendee crashed his vehicle, resulting in serious injury to the
plaintiff. The court held that the motel’s “actions of throwing out intoxicated
under age teenagers onto the motoring public was the worse [sic] possible option
the [motel] did exercise, after allowing them to get intoxicated there.” Id. at 570.
130. See generally GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101.
131. See Ivan Lovegren, Dram Shop Laws Penalize the Wrong People, THE
DAILY NEBRASKAN, http://www.dailynebraskan.com/ivan-lovegren-dram-shoplaws-penalize-the-wrong-people/article_4628022f-891e-5b0c-837e-7cd78dac827c
.html (last updated Mar. 3, 2006) (discussing an initial jury award of $35 million
against a liquor store in F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d
680 (Tex. 2005) while the drunk driver was not held civilly liable).
132. See id.
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VI. WHEN JUDICIALLY CREATED LAW LAGS:
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
The United States is comprised of approximately 326
million people; however, there are 396 million cell phone
service accounts.133 The United States Supreme Court has
described cell phone usage in the U.S. as “such a pervasive
and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from
Mars might conclude they were an important feature of
human anatomy.”134 Solidifying this sentiment, the
Modisette court noted that “[i]t is not only foreseeable that
millions of people will have their cell phones in their cars—
it is almost a certainty.”135
Although New York courts could absolutely recognize
sender liability without expanding the traditional concepts
of duty, it may take many years for the right case to percolate
through the system, giving the courts an opportunity to
recognize sender liability. In the event the courts do not find
the opportunity to recognize this basic concept of duty, the
legislature should step in before more innocent people are
injured or killed due to texting while driving. New York State
has recognized the pervasive use of cellphones by drivers and
the associated dangers.136 Section 1225(c) of New York
State’s Vehicle and Traffic Law restricts drivers from holding
a mobile telephone to the user’s ear, dialing or answering a
mobile telephone, or reaching for a mobile telephone in a way
that requires the driver to move to a position that is not a
driving position.137 Recently, New York has become stricter
with its distracted driving laws, where a violation of such
results in five violation points and a fine.138 Reducing
133. Modisette v. Apple Inc., 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 221 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
134. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014).
135. Modisette, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 222.
136. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1225(c) (McKinney 2013).
137. Id.
138. Cell Phone Use & Texting, N.Y. DEP’T MOTOR VEHICLES (last visited Feb.
11, 2020), dmv.ny.gov/tickets/cell-phone-use-texting.
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distracted driving has been an imperative initiative in New
York, opening the doors for possible recognition of sender
liability by the legislature.139
A. The Development of Cellphone Software to Limit Use
when Driving
Following complaints of technology manufacturers’
failure to incorporate software that “warns” drivers or “locks”
the phone from allowing distractions, many applications, or
“apps,” have been developed to meet demands.140 Apps that
block texting while driving include Cellcontrol, Live2Txt,
and Drive Safe Mode.141 Cellcontrol includes a device, which
the manufacturer installs under the dashboard of a car and
blocks sending or receiving text messages while the vehicle
is in motion.142 Both Cellcontrol and Drive Safe Mode will
alert parents when the device is disabled or overridden. 143
Live2Txt is unique in that, when activated, the app alerts
the sender of a text message with a message that the driver
is unable to respond at the moment.144 These apps not only
deter drivers from texting while driving, but apps such as
Live2Txt also provide the sender of text messages with
knowledge that the driver is unable to respond. 145 The most
extreme of these new technologies to deter distracted driving
is ORIGOSafe, a device that, when installed, restricts the
vehicle from starting until the phone is docked into the
center console.146 Currently, it seems that particularly large
139. Kingsley Nwamah, Reasonable Mistakes of Law in the Digital Age
Following Heien v. North Carolina, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 532, 547–48 (2017).
140. See Evan Shamoon, Best Apps to Block Texting While Driving, VERIZON
WIRELESS, https://www.verizonwireless.com/articles/best-apps-to-block-textingwhile-driving/ (last updated Jan. 24, 2016).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. ORIGOSAFE DISTRACTED DRIVING SYSTEM, https://vehicletechstore.com/
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companies who are looking to reduce incidents of their
drivers engaging in distracted driving have considered this
technology in a limited capacity.147 These apps, software, and
locking devices are novel technologies, but, as more
statistical data is gathered, they may become more prevalent
among licensed drivers.
Courts have yet to impose the use of these types of
applications or devices in cases where drivers caused
accidents by texting and driving.148 However, it is
conceivable that courts may order offenders to install
interlock devices after charges associated with distracted
driving in the future.149 Similar to those convicted of drunk
driving being ordered to pay for, install, and maintain
interlock equipment that disables the vehicle until a
negative breathalyzer test is administered, courts may
impose those convicted of distracted driving to submit to an
interlock device that disables the vehicle until a cellphone is
docked and remains docked.150 Although courts have not
implemented this practice, the Rhode Island legislature has
considered this approach to deterring rates of repeat
distracted-driving offenses.151 Unfortunately, given the
courts’ reluctance to require recidivist distracted drivers to
install interlock devices or software applications and the lack
product/origosafe-distracted-driving-system/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2019).
147. Id.
148. Adam M. Gershowitz, Texting While Driving Meets the Fourth
Amendment: Deterring Both Texting and Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 54
ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 611 (2012) (“[T]here is no reason why states cannot require
offenders convicted of texting while driving to use such devices, just as most
states require drivers convicted of driving drunk to use alcohol ignition interlock
devices.”).
149. See id.
150. It is conceivable that future courts may consider requiring distracted
driving offenders to install an interlock device in their vehicles. Distracted
driving is equally as dangerous as driving while intoxicated and courts are willing
to require the installation of interlock devices to “reduce the dangers of recidivist
drunk driving.” See id.
151. Id. (noting that the proposal has been at a standstill since being shelved
after it was proposed during a committee hearing).
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of action on behalf of state legislatures, this innovative idea
may not become a reality for years to come.
B. Cellphone Software’s Insufficiency to Solve Texting and
Driving Accidents
Although innovative, technology, software, and apps
developed to deter texting while driving have been less than
effective overall.152 Products such as Live2Txt are making
steps in the right direction; however, they still allow the
driver’s phone to receive a text message, causing the phone
to notify the driver of the message.153 Phone companies are
not willing to disable phones, as the technology can be
unreliable, resulting in passengers’ phones being disabled
while in a moving vehicle.154 Even if manufacturers could
improve the technology to disable drivers’ phones, companies
remain hesitant to control their customers, who pay the
service to “communicate on the go.”155 Without technology
manufacturers such as Apple and Samsung deploying
message-blocking software, parties continue to seek other
avenues of relief through imposing liability on third parties.
C. Dram Shop Law as a Blueprint for Sender Liability
Sender liability seeks to impose a duty on third parties
who are not in the vehicle but who text a driver and which
text distracts the driver, resulting in the driver causing an

152. See Matt Richtel, Phone Makers Could Cut off Drivers. So Why Don’t
They?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/25/
technology/phone-makers-could-cut-off-drivers-so-why-dont-they.html.
153. See generally id.
154. Id.
155. Documents uncovered during a recent trial suggest that Apple has
patented technology on software that would lock a driver’s phone. This software
is able to detect if the phone is moving and if the driver is using the phone.
Despite this, Richtel suggests that Apple has not deployed this technology
because controlling its paying customers could have a negative effect on its
profits. Id.
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accident and injuring another.156 New York’s Dram Shop
laws seek to impose a duty on third parties who are not at
the site of an accident but who serve an intoxicated customer,
resulting in an intoxicated driver causing an accident and
injuring another.157 When defined side by side, sender
liability and Dram Shop laws do not look significantly
different.158 Both laws seek to curb an epidemic by placing
liability on remote third parties, where their negligence
contributed significantly to the resulting harm.159 Therefore,
New York’s Dram Shop Act serves as an appropriate
blueprint for the legislature to design a sender liability
statute.
1. Major Differences and Gaps in the Law
Dram Shop laws and sender liability have a few
conceptual similarities; however, this does not erase the fact
that there are notable differences between the two types of
third-party liability. There is no doubt that sender liability
does not neatly fit into Dram Shop laws, as Dram Shop laws
focus intently on commercial suppliers of alcohol, and the
third party, namely, the seller of alcohol, has direct contact
with the intoxicated individual prior to the accident.160
156. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
157. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 11-100, 11-101 (McKinney 2010).
158. See LeBeau, supra note 7 (summarizing findings from a test designed to
test reaction times when sober, when legally drunk at 0.08 blood alcohol content,
when reading an e-mail, and when sending a text message). When unimpaired,
the driver took .54 seconds to break and when legally drunk this added four feet
to the location where the vehicle came to a full stop. Compare these numbers to
the thirty-six feet added when reading an e-mail and seventy feet added when
sending a text message.
159. See Meador v. Apple Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2018) (comparing
technology manufacturer liability to Dram Shop laws). The court stated, “[t]o our
minds, the closest analogy offered by Texas law is so-called dram shop liability:
the liability of commercial purveyors of alcohol for the subsequent torts or
injuries of the intoxicated customers they served.” Under that law, the court
continued, “a person remains liable for her own negligent acts, but the
incapacitating qualities of the product, which contribute to the person’s
negligence, can subject the seller to liability as well.” Id.
160. GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101.
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The first two elements of New York’s Dram Shop Act
require that the seller unlawfully sold or procured alcohol for
the intoxicant and that the seller sold the alcohol to the
intoxicant when the intoxicant was visibly intoxicated.161
Foundational to these requirements is a direct contact
between the seller and intoxicated individual.162 This gives
the seller an opportunity to view the intoxicated individual
and to make a sound decision to refuse to continue to sell
based on direct observation.163 On the other hand, sender
liability implicates a third-party remote texter who may not
have had any physical contact with the driver in days, weeks,
or at all.164 This element of sender liability further removes
the third-party texter from the driver, causing foreseeability
concerns.165
New York’s Dram Shop Act also requires that the seller
be commercial.166 In Place, the court did not hold the mother
liable for providing alcohol to the driver because liability
under New York’s statute requires there to be a commercial
sale of alcohol.167 Support for this requirement can be found
in the holding of D’Amico v. Christie, a landmark New York
decision in the context of Dram Shop law and
interpretation.168 The D’Amico court held, “[t]hat the statute
is properly limited to sellers of intoxicating liquors is made
plain even by its title: ‘Compensation for injury caused by the
illegal sale of intoxicating liquor.’”169 The body of the statute
also speaks of “unlawfully selling” alcohol.170 This
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1228 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
165. Id. at 1227.
166. Place v. Cooper, 827 N.Y.S.2d 396, 398 (App. Div. 2006).
167. Id.
168. 518 N.E.2d 896, 896 (N.Y. 1987).
169. Id.
170. Id. (“When the Legislature intended to reach the broader category of
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requirement adds an element of responsibility to commercial
establishments in particular, where employees are trained to
identify intoxicated individuals, as opposed to a mere
individual providing alcohol to another.
2. Significant Similarities of Dram Shop Law and
Sender Liability
New York’s Dram Shop Act is not a perfect model for
sender liability to copy verbatim. However, its similarities
are prominently more significant than its differences. Few
laws are perfect reiterations of one another, yet they can
build upon each other and evolve current law to address
contemporary epidemics.171
First, Dram Shop laws have focused on imposing liability
on third parties who are not present at the scene of the
incident.172 Sender liability also seeks to impose liability on
remote third-party “texters” who distract drivers, resulting
in harm to another.173 A policy consideration for imposing
this type of liability on third-party texters is a strategic move
to marry moral duty with legal duty, resulting in liability for
those who have control in sending a distracting text message,
thus engaging in a reasonably foreseeable risk.174 A
secondary policy comparison is that driving while intoxicated
alcohol providers—as it did in 1983 in adding General Obligations Law § 11-100,
applicable to minors—it said exactly that.”).
171. See Meador v. Apple Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 265–66 (5th Cir. 2018); Jordan
Michael, Liability for Accidents From Use and Abuse of Cell Phones: When are
Employers and Cell Phone Manufactures Liable?, 79 N.D. L. REV. 299, 299
(2003) (indicating that approximately eighty-five percent of Americans who own
cell phones use them while they are driving); LeBeau, supra note 7 (concluding
that texting and driving is, on average, more dangerous than drinking and
driving).
172. See generally N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 11-100, 11-101 (McKinney 2010).
173. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
174. Morgan Gough, Judicial Messaging: Remove Texter Liability As Public
Education, 44 U. BALT. L. REV. 469, 483 (2015) (“Just as providing an insane
person with a firearm, or continuing to serve alcohol to a patron who is likely to
drive, irresponsibility enhances the risk of harm, so, too, does willfully inducing
a driver to text while driving.”).
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and distracted driving are both trends that grew
significantly over time, causing substantial injury and death,
demanding legislative action.175
Beyond policy considerations, there is clear statutory
language that suggests Dram Shop laws provide an effective
blueprint for the New York legislature to consider in
enacting sender liability. In order to find liability under
Dram Shop laws, one must prove that: (1) a commercial
establishment sold alcohol to (2) a visibly intoxicated
individual, and (3) such behavior resulted in injury to
another.176 Likewise, the court in Kubert held that sender
liability could only be found when, (1) a texter sends a
message to (2) an individual they know or should know is
driving and would be distracted by the message, and (3) such
behavior resulted in injury to another.177
The Kubert court structured sender liability around the
full duty analysis presented in Desir, which includes
considerations of the following four factors when imposing
third-party liability: (1) the relationship of the parties, (2) the
nature of the risk, (3) the ability to exercise care, and (4)
public policy considerations.178 In sender liability cases, the
parties typically know each other well, the texter knows that
if the recipient receives a text message it will be distracting,
refraining from texting is an easy and effective solution, and
there are vast public policy arguments that urge drivers not
to drive distracted and risk the innocent lives of others.179
The relationship of the parties negates some of the
criticisms regarding the ability to relate sender liability to

175. See Ogozalek, supra note 7 and accompanying text; LeBeau, supra note 7
(concluding that reaction times are up to four times slower when checking an email or text message on your phone while driving than drivers who drive
undistracted).
176. See GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101.
177. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1219.
178. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
179. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1229.
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Dram Shop laws. Although a texter may not have the same
direct physical contact with the driver as does a bartender
with an intoxicated consumer, texters and drivers tend to
have an arguably closer personal relationship than any given
intoxicated person has with a bartender. Most individuals
frequently text their significant others, close friends,
siblings, and parents. These people are close to the individual
and typically know the individual’s habits such as whether
or not they text and answer calls while driving, whether they
allow more than three minutes to pass before sending a
response, or whether they habitually leave their phone in the
glovebox when they are in the car. This personal knowledge
of the third party about the character, behavior, and habits
of the driver is unique to third-party liability scenarios.
Perhaps it is this strong personal knowledge and
relationship that establishes a sufficient connection between
the driver and third-party texter that makes it possible to
hold the third party liable. Therefore, it follows that a texter
sending a message to a driver who, due to a special, personal
relationship, knows that the driver will be urged to
immediately respond to the text message, can foresee that
their behavior could reasonably cause a harm to the
public.180 This special relationship and foreseeability is
debatably much stronger than the relationship between a
bartender and a random intoxicated customer.
3. Considerations for a Sender Liability Statute in New
York State
Given that distracted driving continues to become a
societal norm, New York State should proactively address
this issue through sender liability legislation. Vega was the
first and only opportunity that the New York courts had at
analyzing and determining the merits of sender liability.
Unfortunately, the facts of the case were weak, with evidence
proving that Cratsley did not have knowledge, nor should she

180. See id.

2020]

TEXTERS AS CO-CREATORS OF RISK

745

have reasonably known that the decedent was driving.181
Without a special relationship between the parties that
would arguably prove that Cratsley knew the decedent was
driving and that the text messages would provoke him in
such a manner as to distract him from driving, the court did
not have a fact pattern to work with to sufficiently consider
sender liability.182 Given the lack of evidence, the case did
not survive summary judgment.183 Notably, the court stated:
This court is not ignorant of the many steps taken by not only
this state, but others in the nation, to protect against motorists
texting while driving. While that certainly is not the only issue
presented for consideration, this court does not believe it is the
province of a court to establish a precedent for want of a statute that
otherwise has not been considered, let alone approved, by a
legislative body. Though many would prefer a court simply to make
law where either a legislative body or executive has failed to do so,
this court does not believe that is its role. It is not the role of the
judiciary to sit on high and promulgate what it believes should have
been a policy determination made elsewhere. Instead, the courts
have deferred to the wisdom, or absence of it, of the legislature in
defining what is actionable and what is not. 184

The court’s language in Vega does not outright reject the
concept and principles of sender liability.185 Rather, the court
leaves the issue open for the New York State legislature to
address.186 Although the courts could still recognize sender
liability, as it is not a revolutionary expansion of duty, given
the distracted driving epidemic in New York, the legislature
should address the issue by creating law instead of waiting
for more tragic accidents to occur.
Sender liability is very structured and limited to quite
specific situations.187 The New York State legislature could
181. Vega v. Crane, 49 N.Y.S.3d 264, 266–67 (Sup. Ct. 2017).
182. Id. at 268.
183. Id. at 272.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. See generally id.; Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
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create a sender liability statute that will deter the occurrence
of texting while driving while not egregiously expanding
third-party duty. In her article that suggests cell phones are
a new form of “weapons of mass destruction,” Linda
Fentiman notes that insurance companies address issues
more swiftly when the companies themselves feel the “sting
of large jury verdicts.”188 If the legislature enacted sender
liability law, insurance companies would be likely to follow
suit by revising structures to provide rewards to those in
compliance.189 Fentiman suggests that insurance companies
reward employers who enact company policies against
distracted driving, individuals who take “safe driving”
courses that speak to the dangers of distracted driving, or
even provide incentives to drivers who install devices in their
vehicles that disable the driver’s phone while the car is in
motion.190
Although critics argue that sender liability may cause a
“slippery slope” for liability, realistically, this is unlikely to
be the case.191 Enacting sender liability legislation would not
negate the duty that drivers have to use reasonable care
while driving, including not allowing distracting stimuli to
interfere with their driving.192 Furthermore, sender liability
implicitly requires a level of conscious awareness on behalf
of the texter of the danger before the text is sent.193 This
Div. 2013).
188. Linda C. Fentiman, A New Form of WMD? Driving with Mobile Device
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, 81 UMKC L. REV. 133, 180 (2012).
189. Id. at 180–81.
190. Id. at 182 (“[S]trict product liability law revolutionized the behavior of
product manufacturers and dram shop and social host liability statutes cut down
on the behavior of furnishing alcohol to presently or potentially inebriated
drivers.” (footnote omitted)).
191. Gough, supra note 174, at 485 (considering the argument that the Kubert
rule may not remain confined to text messaging and could include distractions
created by any app such as Facebook messages, Twitter replies, Snapchat images,
email, or even voicemail messages).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 487.
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knowledge requirement limits sender liability sufficiently.
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VII.CONCLUSION
A special relationship is formed when an individual texts
another who is driving and they reasonably know that the
driver will be distracted by the text message and encouraged
to at least read and potentially respond. 194 In this
circumstance, the texter has a duty to act reasonably when
the action they are about to make foreseeably creates a risk
of harm to others.195 This traditional negligence concept
appears in many third-party duty statutes, such as social
host and Dram Shop liability.196 Using this concept to enact
a sender liability statute would effectively deter distracted
driving, especially in cases of texting and driving.
The New York legislature enacted the Dram Shop Act in
response to the epidemic of driving while intoxicated, which
caused hundreds of fatalities per year.197 Today’s epidemic of
distracted driving is analogous to that of the prevalence of
drunk driving, which demanded attention from the
legislature.198 New York’s Dram Shop Act provides a
blueprint for potential sender liability law because it limits
liability to those who have a special relationship with the
driver, requires a knowledge component that the driver is a
foreseeable risk to others, and imposes a causation
requirement where the behavior of the third party was
materially significant in causing the incident. Similarly,
sender liability imposes liability on a third-party texter who
has knowledge that the individual is driving and will be
distracted by the text message and such distraction is

194. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1226 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
195. Id.
196. See generally N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 11-100, 11-101 (McKinney 2010);
Rust v. Reyer, 693 N.E.2d 1074, 1076 (N.Y. 1998).
197. See GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101; D’Amico v. Christie, 518 N.E.2d 896,
898 (N.Y. 1987); Berkeley v. Arthur Park, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290, 293 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
198. See GEN. OBLIG. §§ 11-100, 11-101; Ogozalek, supra note 7; NAT’L
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 6 and accompanying text; LeBeau,
supra note 7.
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materially significant in causing an accident.199
The New York State courts have not been allotted the
opportunity to consider a case containing facts that would
survive summary judgment and allow full sender liability
analysis. Without this, as concluded by the Vega court, it is
the role of the New York State legislature to step in and
intervene in an epidemic that kills more than 3,000 people
and injures almost 400,000 people in a year.200 Sender
liability, if recognized by the New York legislature, will
discourage dangerous conduct efficiently. The elements are
difficult to meet, as it requires a remote texter with
knowledge that the recipient is driving and will be distracted
by the text.201 However, in the cases where it does apply, it
will stop individuals from mindlessly distracting drivers who
must take care while on the road, resulting in fewer
accidents and ultimately, fewer deaths. If recognition of
sender liability in New York saved even one life, it would be
well worth the effort.

199. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1226.
200. See Vega v. Crane, 49 N.Y.S.3d 264, 271 (Sup. Ct. 2017); NAT’L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 6 and accompanying text.
201. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1226.

